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Abstract
This paper analyzes the value of exibility in quality choice using a dynamic real-
option framework. Firms decide about quality of their products when they enter the
market upon incurring a sunk cost. Flexibility in quality choice induces ceteris paribus
earlier investment, and the value of exible quality increases with demand uncertainty.
We also nd that the possibility of competitive entry more than doubles the relative value
of exibility. Moreover, we show that exible quality serves as an entry deterrent control,
while it can still be set at the optimal monopoly level. Furthermore, we extend the theory
of strategic real options from which it is known that the followers investment timing is
irrelevant for the decision of the leader. The addition of a second control (quality) results
in the leaders investment timing being inuenced by the followers entry. It also holds
that introducing the second control variable in combination with strategic interaction
results in the option value of the leader decreasing in uncertainty. Finally, we show that
the follower can be driven out of the market due to aggressive quality choice of the
leader in high states of demand.
Keywords: real options, dynamic programming, market entry, second-mover advan-
tage.
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1 Introduction
In the recent period of rapid technological change and high market uncertainty the
oligopolistic market structure appears to dominate many sectors of the economy. This out-
come is partially a consequence of the wave of mergers and acquisitions having occurred in
traditionally more competitive industries. Moreover, the prevalence of oligopolistic markets is
caused by deregulation in sectors as energy and telecommunications, where incumbents start
facing competition of new entrants. Finally, successful new business models in the internet
economy are often mimicked by imitators, which leads to a market structure with several
rms competing in a particular product market.
An uncertain economic environment results in rms managing their investment op-
portunities not only by choosing the timing of market entry but also by selecting product
characteristics, such as quality. Higher quality is associated with higher costs but allows for
capturing the benets of good states of demand. On the contrary, bad states of demand
can lead to lower quality since the cost of possible quality improvement outweighs benets
from a moderate increase of the consumers interest in the product. For example, the op-
tions available to the subscribers of a Japanese operator NTT DoCoMo via the i -mode and
related third generation (3G) services have been scaled down comparing to the initial plans
since demand, in relation to the associated costs, turned out to be lower than expected.
Consequently, at the time of launching the new product, the subscribers did not have the
possibility of videoconferencing or receiving video clips, and what remains in the package
o¤ered to them is accessing e-mail, downloading news and weather reports, and calling up
location-specic information. Adding new services was planned to be considered if the future
demand was su¢ ciently high.1 The case of the Japanese operator illustrates that rms face
a trade-o¤ between the costs of quality and foregone revenues resulting from o¤ering limited
functionality of the product. In this paper we analyze the impact of demand uncertainty
and competition on the optimal choice of the rms strategic variables, such as investment
timing and the product quality, as well as on its valuation. Given the scale of new technology
projects, for example, 3G taken alone entails $100 billion in licences and another $400 billion
in developing infrastructure, providing the appropriate valuation framework appears to be a
well-motivated task.2
We apply the real options approach which allows to determine the value of exibility
concerning the investment timing and the quality of the o¤ered product/service. The imple-
mentation of option-based techniques requires taking into consideration two major di¤erences
between nancial and real options. First, in most cases real options are not exclusive, i.e.
exercising a given option by one party results in the termination of corresponding options
1See The Economist, October 13-19, 2001, The Mobile Internet: A Survey.
2 Ibid.
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held by other parties.3 For example, an option to lay down a ber-optic cable between an
internet backbone and a residential area is alive only until a competitive rm does so. Second,
the rm can inuence both the value of the underlying asset as well as the exercise price of
the corresponding option. In many situations there exists a positive relationship between the
amount of the sunk cost and the protability of the project (i.e. via the level of automati-
zation of the production process or via the product quality). Consequently, the rm is often
faced with a menu of mutually exclusive real options with di¤erent exercise prices and payo¤
structures.
Both these aspects of real options have been incorporated into this paper and are
applied to investigate the investment decision in a market with stochastic demand, positive
network externalities and competitive entry threat. We develop a strategic model in which a
rm chooses the timing of irreversible investment and the quality of the product. Competitive
entry occurs as a result of the optimal investment decision of a second rm. We compare the
cases of xed and exible quality in order to determine the additional value of exibility in
quality choice. Flexible quality, which can be adjusted over time, requires su¢ cient know-how
within the rm, the use of a more advanced technology or a contractual exibility (e.g. via
a exible agreement with content providers in the case of a 3G mobile operator). Fixed and
exible quality can also be interpreted as resulting from a licensed and internally developed
technology, respectively. In the xed quality case, once chosen quality cannot be changed.
For instance, it may not be possible for an internet infrastructure provider to save on quality
reduction (equivalent to narrowing bandwidth capacity) since ber-optic cable cannot be
easily resold or hired to another party during market downturn. Adding capacity when
the demand is high can also be prohibitively costly, especially if the high state of demand
results from its high volatility. In case of exible quality, the rm is able to change it at a
low cost in response to demand uctuations and/or competitive entry. In practice, exible
quality is often associated with higher up-front costs. We show that these higher costs are
especially justied in competitive environments with large demand uncertainty where the
value of exible quality more than doubles compared to the monopoly case.
Consequently, we aim at unifying two streams of literature: strategic real options and
industrial organization-based endogenous quality choice.4 As far as the real option framework
is concerned, our model builds up upon such contributions as Smets (1991), Grenadier (1996),
Perotti and Rossetto (2000), Huisman (2001), Nielsen (2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin
(2003), and Mason and Weeds (2003), which all have in common that they analyze the
e¤ects of both competition and uncertainty on investment timing. Reinganum (1981), and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) provide the game-theoretical foundations within a deterministic
framework.
3Cf. Trigeorgis (1996), p. 274, and Zingales (2000).
4 In a recent paper, Pennings (2002) analyzes the optimal quality choice in a real options framework using
a di¤erent model set-up.
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Introducing quality choice as a strategic variable results in the extension of the ex-
isting continuous-time strategic real options framework to a class of models in which rms
are equipped with two control variables. Besides choosing the timing of investment, the rms
now also have to decide about the optimal quality of the product they are going to o¤er. The
implication is that some of the classic real options results cease to hold. For example, in the
xed quality case, the optimal investment timing of the second rm is no longer irrelevant for
the investment decision of the leader in the open-loop strategies (cf. Huisman, 2001). This is
due to the fact that the entry decision of the follower interacts with the second control vari-
able of the leader (quality), which, in turn, inuences the leaders optimal investment timing.
With exible quality the followers investment decision becomes again irrelevant since the
leader can change quality instantaneously. As a consequence, until the followers entry it can
act as a monopolist, thus without being inuenced by the entry threat.
In this paper it is shown that, due to strategic interaction between the leader and
follower, the value of the investment option of the former can decrease with uncertainty if
the xed-quality technology is used. Moreover, the value of the leader is lower than the one
of the follower. This latter result is due to the strategic disadvantage of the rst mover in
a Stackelberg game in which rms compete in strategic complements. Once the leader has
invested it cannot change its quality. Hence, the follower is in the comfortable position where
it can optimally adjust its quality level to the leaders choice. The situation reverses under
the exible-quality technology of the leader. Now, the value of the follower, which still has a
xed quality choice, can decrease with uncertainty since its projects value becomes concave
in the realizations of random demand. This is caused by the fact that now the leader can
change its quality level after the follower has made its choice.
Furthermore, we show that in the exible-quality case the leader can drive its com-
petitor out of the market in high states of the demand. This is caused by the fact that the
leader can a¤ord investing in high quality when demand is high. This reduces the demand for
the product o¤ered by the follower to zero for states of demand exceeding a certain trigger.
Flexible quality can thus serve as an entry deterrent control. In this case the quality level
need not be set higher than monopoly level since the leaders ability to raise quality instantly
after a potential entry is su¢ cient to prevent such an entry from occurring.
We also discuss the impact of network externalities on the optimal investment timing,
quality choice and rmsvaluations. Since, from the point of view of a consumer, an increase
of the degree of network externalities can compensate the decrease in quality, the optimal
quality choice of rms is inversely related to network externalities. Moreover, rms invest
sooner and their valuations are higher when the product market exhibits strong network
externalities.
As far as the literature on strategic quality choice is concerned, our model is related
to the contributions by Motta (1993), Aoki and Prusa (1996), Foros and Hansen (2001),
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Dubey and Wu (2002), Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) and Banker et al. (1998). In
general, it can be remarked that we generalize this stream of research by analyzing a dynamic,
continuous-time framework while taking into account economic uncertainty.
Motta (1993) considers a two-stage duopoly model with either xed or variable costs
of quality (i.e. independent from or proportional to the scale of improvement). Fixed costs
can be associated with R&D or advertising activities. Variable costs, that correspond to
our framework, reect more skilled labor and more expensive raw materials and inputs.
The result of the paper is that rms di¤erentiate qualities, which is possible due to setting
di¤erent prices. In a similar framework Aoki and Prusa (1996) analyze optimal sequential and
simultaneous quality choice. Again, due to the fact that the authors assume only vertical
product di¤erentiation and price competition, there exists a rst-mover advantage in the
quality choice game. In our case, products are di¤erentiated also horizontally, so the rms
set di¤erent qualities even if the cost of the good to consumer is equal. As a consequence,
qualities become strategic complements, reaction curves are continuous, and the prot of the
second mover is higher.
Foros and Hansen (2001) apply a two-stage model extended to allow for horizontal
di¤erentiation and network externalities to the market of Internet Service Providers. They
nd that the optimal choice of quality is positively related to network externalities. Their
result di¤ers from ours due to the fact that in Foros and Hansen (2001) the substitution e¤ect
between quality and network externalities is dominated by the impact of lower competitive
pressure resulting from higher network externalities.
Dubey and Wu (2002) investigate rmsincentives to invest in product innovation,
which ultimately leads to a quality increase. They show that the relationship between the
number of rms and the propensity to innovate is bell-shaped. In other words, if the number
of rms is too large or too small the innovation process does not occur. The results
of Dubey and Wu (2002) are consistent with our model that predicts that the possibility of
entry increases the quality provided by the otherwise monopolistic rm. Using a di¤erent
analytical framework Banker et al. (1998) conclude that in the absence of synergies among
the rms in the quality cost, an increasing number of rms leads to decreasing quality. This
nding coincides with the argument of Dubey and Wu (2002) for a too large number of
rms and is caused by the fact that improving quality is assumed to be su¢ ciently costly.
An alternative dynamic model of strategic quality choice is developed by Hoppe and
Lehmann-Grube (2001). In their framework, the rms chose the optimal timing of entry,
given that the available quality is a deterministic function of time. Prior to the investment,
rms are assumed to pay R&D costs which are proportional to time until investing. The
authors show that, depending on the cost of R&D, there can be either rent equalization (cf.
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985) or a second-mover advantage in the quality choice game. The
assumption made by Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001) that the costs of higher quality are
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incurred prior to investment di¤ers from ours in which the costs of quality occur after the
investment is made (similar to the notion of variable quality costs in Motta, 1993). As a
consequence, contrary to Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2001), we do not observe the rst-
mover advantage (corresponding to payo¤ equalization without exogenous rmsroles) in the
xed-quality case in our model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model of a monopolistic
rm with a xed-quality technology. Section 3 extends the model to a duopolistic environ-
ment. The discussion of the monopolistic model with a exible quality choice is presented in
Section 4 and the analysis of its duopolistic extension is included in Section 5. In Section 6
we compare the impact of exible quality on the value of the rm. Section 7 concludes.
2 Non-Strategic Model with Fixed Quality
Consider a situation in which a risk-neutral rm has an investment opportunity to launch
a product/service in an uncertain market. It chooses the optimal investment timing and
quality of the product. In this section we assume that once chosen quality cannot be changed.
The idea of the xed quality choice is therefore similar to Ueng (1997), who considers an
innitely repeated oligopoly game in which the qualities are chosen before the rst period. It
is realistic to assume that the revenue per customer is not constant but evolves stochastically
over time.5 The instantaneous revenue per customer at time t is equal to x (t) ; where x
follows the geometric Brownian motion
dx (t) = x (t) dt+ x (t) dw (t) : (1)
Here  denotes the deterministic drift rate and  is the instantaneous volatility of the process.
In the analysis we assume that the initial realization of (1), x (0), is su¢ ciently low, so that
in all possible cases the market is too small for immediate investment to be optimal.
There is a continuum of heterogenous consumers with valuations !i distributed uni-
formly over the interval [0; 1]. A consumer derives utility not only from the stand-alone good
but also from the number of other consumers using it. A utility function satisfying these
characteristics is6
Ui = !iq + an  k; (2)
5For instance, the revenue per customer of a mobile telephone network depends on the intensity of voice
tra¢ c, competitive pressure, and arrival of new services that can be o¤ered to the customer against an
additional fee. It is natural to assume that the evolution of these economic variables over time contains an
unpredictable component.
6Heterogeneity of consumers with respect to the value attached to the quality of the stand-alone good
and their homogeneity with respect to the degree of network externalities is a common assumption in the
economics of network literature (cf. Mason, 2000, and references therein).
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where q 2 R+ is the quality of the good, k 2 R+ is the cost the consumer has to bear to acquire
the good, and a 2 R+ is a parameter that measures the intensity of the network externalities.7
Consequently, !i can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income and
quality, so that a higher !i reects a lower marginal utility of income and, as a consequence,
a higher income (see also Tirole, 1988, p. 98). Large a implies that the consumers utility
grows fast with the number of other users. In the opposite case, when a tends to zero, the
number of users of the same good does not a¤ect the utility of the consumer.8 The size of
the network, n 2 [0; 1], is interpreted as the fraction of the total market that has bought a
given product. Without loss of generality, we normalize the absolute size of the total market
to 1.
Network externalities are thus present if the number of other consumers using the
same product inuences the utility of a given consumer. Positive (negative) network exter-
nalities imply that the utility of the consumer increases (decreases) with the number of other
users. An example of a good a demand for which exhibits positive network externalities is an
access to the web via a given Internet Service Provider, a computer operating system, an au-
dio recorder using a particular standard (DCC, MD, or CD-R), or a mobile phone (GSM vs.
CDMA). We analyze a good for which the consumers utility depends both on the network
size and the quality (MacOS vs. Windows). The purchase decision is determined mainly
by these two parameters, so that we do not incorporate a pricing strategy. This choice of
modeling approach follows recent empirical evidence. In an analysis of the on-line book retail
market Latcovich and Smith (2001) claim that consumers do not respond much to signif-
icant price di¤erences between sellers [...]. But they [...] care about vertical characteristics
such as reliability, security, and ease of use. This supports the idea of the quality-oriented
market analyzed in our paper. Also Shapiro and Varian (1998) point out that the price is an
insignicant determinant of the purchase decision for many network goods, such as software.
Referring to the market for spreadsheets they claim that the purchase price of the software
is minor in comparison with the cost of deployment, training and support. Corporate pur-
chasers, and even individual customers, were much more worried about picking the winner of
the spreadsheet wars than they were about whether their spreadsheet costs $49.95 or $99.95
(Shapiro and Varian, 1998, p. 288).
On the basis of the consumers utility function, we can determine the size of the
network as a function of the quality chosen by the rm. Dene the consumer of type ! to be
indi¤erent between acquiring the good or not. Consequently, it holds that
!q + an  k = 0: (3)
7Parameter k should not be associated with a price that the consumer has to pay for the product. It can
be interpreted as a non-monetary cost associated with the e¤ort and time used for searching the good with
suitable characteristics.
8Of course, there are examples of negative a as well. For instance, the utility from having a Rolls-Royce is
decreasing in the number of other owners of this brand in the neighborhood.
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By setting a < k < q, which is to ensure an interior solution for the size of the network (we




q   a: (4)
We further assume a constant value per customer, constant economies of scale on the
supply side, and that the unit cost of operation, c (q), satises c0 (q) > 0 and c00 (q)  0. The
rm chooses quality q so as to maximize the value of the investment opportunity. In order to
determine the value of the investment opportunity, we begin with calculating the value of the
project after the investment decision is made. The value of the project is found by integrating
over time the discounted di¤erence between the instantaneous value of the installed base of
consumers, xn (q), and the operating costs c (q)n (q).9 Therefore, if we denote the project
value at time t by V (t), it holds that
V (t) = E
Z 1
t






  c (q)n (q)
r
 R (q)x  C (q) (6)
where r is the risk-free rate and , dened as
  r   ; (7)
is the return shortfall of the demand process x. The rm has to incur a sunk investment
cost, I 2 R++. Although I does not depend on the choice of quality, the cost associated with
pursuing the project increases with quality due to a higher present value of operating costs.10
The decision of the rm is to choose the optimal quality, q, and timing of entry, x, in order
to maximize the value of the investment opportunity.
To nd the optimal investment threshold and product quality we proceed in two steps.
First, we solve the optimal stopping problem for an arbitrary level of q. As an intermediate
result we obtain the optimal investment threshold and the value of the investment opportunity
as a function of q. Second, we maximize the value of the investment opportunity with respect
to q.





I + C (q)
R (q)
; (8)
9The instantaneous value of the installed base of consumers can be obtained by integrating the utilities
of participating consumers over their types,
R 1
!
(!q + an  k) d!. This equals 0:5n2a + 0:5 (q   k)n which is
convex in n. However, here we assume that the rm does not price discriminate so that it does not extract
the whole consumer surplus. Instead, we impose linearity in n of the rms prot.
10An alternative interpretation of the cost structure is that the initial investment outlay equals I +




















The value of the investment opportunity, F (q; x), equals






(I + C (q))1 1
: (10)
The derivation of (8), (9) and (10) follows directly from Dixit and Pindyck (1996). Sub-
sequently, we maximize the value of the investment opportunity with respect to q, given
the optimal investment rule, x (q). In order to ensure that our solution is a maximum, we
introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Let q be the solution to @F (q; x)=@q = 0. Then it holds that11
(1 (C + I)Rqq + CqRq   (1   1)CqqR)jq=q < 0: (11)
The solution to the problem of quality choice is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1 the optimal quality of the product, q, is implicitly given
by the following equation
Cq = x
Rq: (12)
Proof. See Appendix A.
From Proposition 1 it is obtained that the value of the investment opportunity is max-
imized if at the optimal investment threshold the marginal cost of increasing the quality is
equal to the expected marginal benet. (12) implies that in the optimum the ratio of elastic-










where "f;x  xfxf .
In order to provide more insight into the obtained result, we analyze the relationship
between market uncertainty, intensity of the network externalities, size of the network and
the optimal quality. Proposition 2 provides part of the results.
11When it does not yield ambiguity, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The fact that higher uncertainty concerning the demand side of the market inuences
the quality choice of the rm positively results from the option-like structure of the project
value and upside potential from higher quality investment. Furthermore, a higher growth rate
of the market also implies a higher quality choice since the rm prefers to incur additional
cost to increase quality when revenue is expected to grow faster.12
Furthermore, numerical simulations indicate that the impact of network externalities
on the optimal quality choice is negative. The latter relationship results from the fact that
the level of quality and the degree of network externalities act as substitutes in the marginal
consumers utility function. Since a higher quality is equivalent to a larger consumer base
(cf. (4)), the size of the network in optimum, n, also rises with  and .
Market uncertainty and intensity of network externalities also have an impact on the
optimal investment threshold. Since both factors a¤ect the optimal investment threshold
directly and indirectly (via the change of the optimal quality), the total impact is determined











;  2 fa; g: (16)
In Appendix A we prove the following proposition:




Hence, the relationship between uncertainty and the optimal investment threshold is
positive. Therefore we conclude that the exibility in the quality choice does not change the
classical result of real option theory (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996).
Extensive numerical simulations show that the optimal investment threshold de-
creases with a magnitude of network externalities. This is associated with the fact that a
higher magnitude of network externalities makes the product market more valuable for the
rm. This results in a higher value of the investment project (other things equal) and, thus, a
lower value of x su¢ ces to achieve the required protability ratio, 1= (1   1), of the project
at the time of investing.
12The positive sign of the derivative with respect to  is equivalent to the negative derivative with respect
to the return shortfall  of the demand process x.
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3 Strategic Model with Fixed Quality
Here we introduce the possibility of competitive entry by a second rm (Firm 2). In
order to focus on the incumbent-entrant problem, we impose that Firm 2 can only enter after
Firm 1 has already done so (i.e. rms play the timing game in the open-loop strategies as
in Reinganum, 1981). After entering the market, Firm 2 starts o¤ering the good having a
quality q2. In general, q2 will di¤er from q1, i.e. from the quality choice made by Firm 1.
The fact that the rms do not compete in prices implies that for the consumers the cost
of accessing each network is equal across the networks. Consequently, if the products were
perfect substitutes, consumers would always choose the product with a higher quality and the
resulting market outcome would always be a monopoly.13 In case of imperfect substitution
this does not hold any longer. Denote the degree of substitution by  2 (0; 1). For  close to
unity, the goods are close substitutes, whereas a very small  implies that the rms operate
in virtually separated markets.
In order to analyze the impact of entry on the valuation of the rst rm in the market
(Firm 1), we adopt a simple structure for the market with di¤erentiated goods (as in, e.g.,
Spence, 1976) and allow for the presence of network externalities as in Section 2. The system
of inverse demand functions is given by(
k = (1  n1) q1   n2q2 + a (n1 + n2) for Firm 1s network, while
k = (1  n2) q2   n1q1 + a (n2 + n1) for Firm 2s network,
(18)
and ni; n 2 f1; 2g; is the size of Firm is network. Each of the inverse demand functions
can be interpreted as follows. The LHS represents the instantaneous cost (utility loss) of
accessing the network. The RHS corresponds to the linear demand schedule that decreases
with the o¤ered quantities, ni and nj , while its negative slope is reduced by the presence of
a component a (n1 + n2) which reects network externalities. The impact of the quantity
o¤ered by Firm j on Firm is demand, and the network externalities among its consumers is
scaled down by factor  reecting imperfect substitution among the goods. It can be easily
noticed that for nj equal to zero, (18) reduces to the monopolistic demand function of Section
2 (cf. equation (4)).
















qi a qi > qi;
(19)





= k (1  ) + max [k; qj ] ; (20)
qi =
max [k; qj ]  k (1  )

; (21)
and i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j. Depending on the quality o¤ered, Firm i competes with Firm j for
moderate values of qi, it is a monopolist for high qi, or has no customer base if qi is low.
Both qualities q
i
and qi depend positively on quality qj o¤ered by the competitor. Moreover,
higher substitutability of the goods, captured by , results in shrinking the range of qualities
in which rms compete. This is intuitive since the closer substitutes the goods are, the less
they can di¤er in qualities for both rms to be present in the product market. Since the once
chosen qualities remain xed and neither q
i
nor qi depends on x, both rms being active






for i 2 f1; 2g. Otherwise, one of the rms would be better o¤ by
not entering.
For analytical convenience, we impose the following linear specication of the cost
function:
c (qi) = c0 (qi   a) ; c0 2 R++; qi 2 [a;1); (22)
where c0 can be interpreted as an e¢ ciency parameter. Consequently, higher values of c0
correspond to industries that are less e¢ cient in R&D. Setting a quality equal to a (< k) is
equivalent to the rm producing no output and incurring no cost (since ni (a) = c (a) = 0 in
this case). The instantaneous prot function corresponding to (22) is
i = (x  c0 (qi   a))ni: (23)
We solve the problem backwards in time. First, the optimal investment threshold
and quality choice of Firm 2 is determined. The value of Firm 2s investment opportunity at
t  T2 equals
F 2 (t) = E
Z 1
T2
(x (s)  c0 (q2   a))n2(q1; q2)e r(s t)ds  Ie r(T2 t)

; (24)
where T2 denotes the random stopping time associated with x reaching Firm 2s optimal
investment threshold. A well-known procedure (cf. Dixit and Pindyck, 1996) allows for














(q2   a) ; (25)
















2 (1   1)
 (27)








  a+ 41Ir (   1) (1  2) c 10

:
Upon analyzing (27) it can be concluded that the qualities chosen by the rms are strategic
complements. Since q
2
is an increasing function of q1 (see (20)) and q2 rises with q2, the
quality chosen by Firm 2 is positively related to the quality choice made by Firm 1.
This relationship, in combination with a closer inspection of (25), leads to the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 4 Firm 2 responds optimally to an increased quality of Firm 1 not only by








Proof. See Appendix A.
Consequently, it can be concluded from Proposition 4 that the choice of higher q1 is
equivalent to entry-deterrent behavior of Firm 1.
Having calculated the optimal investment threshold of Firm 2, we are in position
to analyze the investment decision of Firm 1. First, we note that the value of Firm 1s
investment project at the time of investing, t, is given by
V1 (t) = E
Z T2
t





(x (s)  c0 (q1   a))n1(q1; q2)e r(s t)ds

: (28)




































Value lost due to the competitive entry
:
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Again, an application of the well-known procedure yields the optimal threshold, x1, and the




I + C (q1)
R (q1)
; (30)
F 1 = (31)
max
q1






















It is worthwhile noticing that the optimal investment timing of Firm 1 does not explicitly
depend on the action taken by Firm 2. This outcome results from the fact that the roles of the
rms (leader vs. follower) are exogenously determined. However, this result still di¤ers from
the classical result from the real options theory (see, e.g., Huisman, 2001, p. 170) concerning
the irrelevance of the followers investment timing for the decision of the leader. The reason
is that Firm 1s timing decision is a¤ected by the choice of quality, q1, and, according to (31),
q1 depends on Firm 2s threshold x2 and on the threshold quality q1, which is a function of
q2 (cf. (20)).
The resulting dependence of Firm 1s investment threshold on the behavior of Firm
2 is caused by the fact that in our model rms have two control variables (investment timing
and quality) as opposite to a single variable in classic real option models. It still holds
that introducing the competitor does not change the optimal ceteris paribus choice of the
timing variable. However, competitive entry changes the optimal choice of quality (the second
control variable). This makes the monopolistic choice of timing no longer optimal and, as a
consequence, it holds that x1 6= x.
As far as the value of the investment opportunity is concerned, it can be determined
by maximizing the argument of the RHS of (31). The derivative of F 1 with respect to q1
can be computed since x1; x

2 and q2 are known functions of q1. Due to complexity of the
resulting relationship, the unique (in the relevant interval) root of the derivative has to be
determined numerically.
3.1 Comparative Statics: Valuation of Firms
We are interested in the sensitivity of the value of the rms with respect to changes of
market parameters. Figures 1a and 1b depict the relationship between the market volatility
and the value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 and Firm 2, respectively, for di¤erent
magnitudes of network externalities.
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0.1522 557102.57F1a43
Figure 1a. The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 for the parameter values  = 0:5;
k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; x0 = 4; and I = 10:
0.1522 557102.57F2a43
Figure 1b. The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 2 for the parameter values  = 0:5;
k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; x0 = 4; and I = 10:
On the basis of Figures 1a and 1b two observations can be made. First, the value of Firm
1s investment opportunity is lower than the one of Firm 2. The rst phenomenon results
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from the strategic disadvantage of the rst mover in a game in which the rms compete
in strategic complements. As it can be shown in a simple Stackelberg setting, the followers
payo¤ is higher than the payo¤ of the leader if the control variables are strategic complements
(cf. Tirole, 1988, p. 331, footnote 53). Despite the fact that Firm 1 enjoys prot from
investment for a longer period (it invests as rst), its value is still lower than the one of Firm
2.
Second, the sign of the relationship between the value of Firm 1s project and uncer-
tainty crucially depends on the magnitude of network externalities, a. The standard option
argument indicates that the sign of this relationship is positive. However, under higher uncer-
tainty Firm 2 sets its quality more aggressively(cf. (14)), which negatively inuences the
value of Firm 1. The sign of the joint e¤ect is ambiguous and reects the above mentioned
trade-o¤. As illustrated in Figure 1a, the presence of strong network externalities amplies
the latter (strategic) e¤ect.
Finally, it can be seen that the presence of the network externalities signicantly
enhances the value of the investment opportunities of both rms. The rate of increase is
most dramatic when the degree of network externalities approaches the cost of joining the
network (i.e. when the marginal consumers valuation of the stand alone-good is equal to
zero). Therefore, for the set of parameters as in Figures 1a and 1b, the change in the value
of the rmsinvestment opportunities following an increase in a from 3 to 4 (k = 5) is higher
than the analogous change associated with an increase in a from 0 to 3.
3.2 Comparative Statics: Firm 1s Strategic Choice of Variables
Finally, we compare the non-strategic and strategic case with respect to Firm 1s optimal
choice of strategic variables. Figures 2a and 2b illustrate the optimal investment threshold,
whereas Figures 3a and 3b depict the optimal quality choice.
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0.152510523xa4
Figure 2a. The optimal investment threshold of Firm 1 in the non-strategic case for the parameter
values  = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and I = 10:
0.152510523x1a4
Figure 2b. The optimal investment threshold of Firm 1 in the strategic case for the parameter values
 = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and I = 10:
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0.152510523qa4
Figure 3a. The optimal quality choice of Firm 1 in the non-strategic case for the parameter values
 = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and I = 10:
0.152510523q1a4
Figure 3b. The optimal quality choice of Firm 1 in the strategic case for the parameter values  = 0:5;
k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and I = 10:
Figures 2a and 2b illustrate that the optimal investment threshold is higher if a
subsequent competitive entry threat exists. This contradicts the result known from the
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strategic real option literature that the optimal investment threshold of the market leader is
not inuenced by the entry threat if the roles of the rms are predetermined. As we already
concluded from (30), Firm 1s investment threshold depends on the investment timing and
quality decision of its competitor.
On the basis of Figures 3a and 3b we conclude that the presence of a (potential)
competitor increases the quality provision of Firm 1. Higher quality (as shown in Section
2), as well as the fact that, from the timing of the second rm onwards, the market must be
shared with the competitor, results in the optimality of a higher - than in the non-strategic
case - investment threshold which, in turn, leads to the outcome depicted in Figure 2b.
This result and the one concerning the projects value contradict the ndings of Foros
and Hansen (2001), who analyze a duopoly model of Internet Service Providers. In a modied
Hotelling framework they show that prots decrease and the o¤ered quality increases with the
degree of network externalities. The reason why this di¤ers from our results is the following.
Here, in a non-strategic framework, network externalities can act as a substitute of quality
in a consumers utility function. Consequently, a rm can have less incentive to invest in
(costly) quality when network externalities are present. This e¤ect also takes place in a
strategic framework if the increase of quality occurs for a single product. In case of Foros
and Hansen (2001), the increase of interconnection quality a¤ects both products so that the
substitution e¤ect is dominated by lower competitive pressure resulting from higher network
externalities.
4 Non-strategic Model with Flexible Quality
Here, it is assumed that within the rm su¢ cient know-how is present for adjusting
quality, which can be valuable in case of changing demand characteristics. The fact that the
rm can change quality could be caused for instance by the fact that its technology is the
result of its own R&D process. Such an interpretation implies that in the previous section
quality was xed because the production technology was provided by an external vendor.
Once the entry threshold, x, is reached, production commences. The marginal cost,
c (q (x)), is a function of the instantaneously chosen product/service quality. This quality is
chosen in such a way that the value of the rm is maximized. In this section we assume that
no competitive entry threat exists.
Consequently, at each point in time the rm chooses quality q (t) such that14
q (x) = argmax
q
[(x  c0 (q   a))n(q)] : (32)
14Our formulation di¤ers from the optimal control models of quality as, e.g., presented by El Ouardighi and
Tapiero (1998, see also references therein) since these authors consider a deterministic setting in which they
include elements absent here such as pricing strategy and learning e¤ects.
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From this the present value of the rms expected cash ow at time t can be determined
V (t) = E
Z 1
t
(x (s)  c0 (q (x (s))  a))n(q (x (s)))e r(s t)ds

: (33)
Since in general we allow for q < k, let us redene n (q) (cf. (4)) as







Maximizing (32) with cost specication (22) leads to the optimal quality choice






 = c0 (k   a)
and 1B is an indicator function. (35) implies that for low states of demand (i.e. for x < )
the optimal choice of quality is a (< k), which corresponds to the situation in which the
market is not served and the rm incurs no cost (see (22)). As soon as x hits  from below,
quality jumps to k and, subsequently, adjusts continuously to changes in x. When x hits 
from above, the quality drops to a and the rm again becomes idle without incurring variable
costs.
Dene the instantaneous prot function, , to be equal to the expression under the






Solving the Bellman equation15
0:52x2V 00 + xV 0 +  = rV (37)




1 for x < ;
BM1x
2 + C0 + C1x
0:5 + C2x for x > ;
(38)
where constants BM1, BM2, C0, C1, and C2 are given by equations (B.1)-(B.5) in Appendix


















15The value of the rm, V , (cf. (33)) still satises the di¤erential equation (37) since q is an F -previsible
process. Consequently,
dV = Vxdx+ 0:5Vxx (dx)
2 + Vqdq = Vxdx+ 0:5Vxx (dx)
2 ;
which, after the substitution of (1), yields the LHS of (37).
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The value functions in the two regimes of the stopping region are the solutions of the standard
ODE (37) with the non-homogeneity term dened by (36). Under the regime x <  demand
is too low and no service/product is o¤ered. Consequently, the value of the rm consists
entirely of the option value to relaunch the activities should the market turn out to be
favorable. For x >  the rm o¤ers the service and makes positive prot. Now, the value
of the rm consists of two parts: the perpetuity value of the current instantaneous prot
and the option-like component reecting the possibility of ceasing the operations if x falls
below . The perpetuity value of the instantaneous prot has the structure of a portfolio of
continuously paid dividends proportional to various powers of the GBM (1).
The optimal investment threshold and the value of the investment opportunity are
found by applying the standard procedure for the optimal exercise of an American option
when the value of the investment project in the stopping region is described by (38). It
should just be noticed that it is never optimal to exercise the investment option for x < 
since by waiting an increment dt the present value of investment cost diminishes by Irdt,
whereas the expected present value of the cash ow remains unchanged. The value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions regarding the expression for V when x >  in (38) are
AMx
1 = BM1x
2 + C0 + C1x




 0:5 + C2: (41)
From (40) and (41) the following implicit equation for the optimal investment threshold, x,
can be obtained
(1   2)BM1 (x)2 + 1 (C0   I) + (1   0:5)C1 (x)0:5
+(1   1)C2x = 0: (42)
The value of the investment opportunity equals
F = (V (x)  I)
 x
x
1  AMx1 ; (43)
where V (x) is given by the rst row in (38).
Here, we would like to make an additional remark concerning the implications of
the exible quality choice on the cost structure. Compared with the xed-quality case, the
e¤ective sunk cost in the current case equals I; as opposed to I + C in the former. Conse-
quently, the choice of exible quality not only allows for optimizing the product parameter
when demand changes but also for avoiding commitment to xed production costs in the
future.
5 Strategic Model with Flexible Quality
In this section we introduce the possibility of entry of a second rm (Firm 2). As in
the xed quality case, such an entry threat is going to inuence both the optimal investment
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timing and the value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1. We proceed as follows. First,
we discuss possible market outcomes dependent on the realization of the stochastic variable,
x. Subsequently, we determine the value of Firm 1 in the situation where both rms have
already invested. Then, we move backwards and calculate the value of Firm 1 after it entered
the market but before Firm 2 invested. Finally, we determine the value of Firm 1s investment
opportunity and its optimal investment threshold, and provide some comparative statics.
As in Section 3, Firm 2 is assumed to have the xed-quality technology. Prot
maximization of Firm 1 yields the following optimal quality schedule
q1 =
8>>><>>>:












; when Firm 1 is a monopolist.
(44)
The rst (idle) and the third (monopoly) case have already been derived in Section 5.4. The
result for the duopoly case can be obtained by maximizing the prot function (23) with
respect to qi, i = 1, and using the observation that n1 is in this case dened by the second
equation in (19). Before we derive Firm 1s prot as a function of x, we formulate the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 There are three regimes of the product market structure when the quality of
Firm 1s product is exible. For low realizations of x the market is served only by the entrant
(Firm 1 stays idle), intermediate realizations of x correspond to the duopoly outcome, whereas
under high realizations of x Firm 1 is a monopolist. The three regimes correspond to the
following intervals
x 2 (0; ') ;
x 2 (';{) ; and















where    (q1   a) ; and q1 and q1 are given by (20) and (21).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The existence of three regimes of quality choice result from the fact that now Firm
1 is able to adjust its quality, q1, as x evolves. Since from (20) and (21) we learn that q2 and
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q2 explicitly depend on q1, it follows that q2 and q2 become functions of x. Consequently,
for low realizations of x (lower than ') Firm 1 remains idle (in order to avoid operating
loss), whereas for intermediate values of x it competes against Firm 2. If x becomes large
(larger than {), Firm 1 can a¤ord to choose quality that is high enough to prevent Firm
2 (with a xed quality q2) from serving the market. Consequently, the quality choice (44)
reects the optimal response in the state of inaction, duopoly and monopoly, respectively.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.
xtq2q2,q2,q2Firm1VL
Figure 4. Trigger qualities q
2
(short-dotted line), q2 (long-dotted line) as a function of x; for the
parameter values  = 0:5; k = 5; a = 2; c0 = 1; and q2 = 7:5 (solid line). For low realizations
of x (below ') only Firm 2 is active in the market whereas for high realizations (above {) Firm 1
becomes a monopolist - the quality of Firm 2 is too low. For intermediate values of x both rms serve
the market since q2 remains within the bounds determined by q2 and q2.
Denote the value of Firm 1, provided that Firm 2 has already entered the market,
by V d1 . V
d


















2 for ' < x < {; p
x p
2 for x > {: (48)
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For x < ' Firm 1 is idle, for x > { it earns monopoly prot, whereas for x 2 (';{) it
has a duopoly prot. The latter can be calculated by substituting the intermediate cases of
(19) and (44) into (23). Solving (47) with the value matching and smooth pasting conditions




1 for x < ';
D1x
2 +D2x
1 + E0 + E1x
0:5 + E2x for ' < x < {;
(D1 +D3)x
2 + C0 + C1x
0:5 + C2x for x > {;
(49)
where (see Appendix B) C0, C1, and C2 are dened by (B.3) - (B.5), whereas coe¢ cients D1,
D2, D3, E0, E1, and E2 are dened by (B.6) - (B.11). Again, it can be seen that the value of
Firm 1 consists of the present value of the expected cash ow and the option-like components
reecting possible switches across regimes. Parameters Ek and Ck, k 2 f1; 2; 3g, correspond
to the duopolistic and monopolistic prot function, respectively. Components of the form
Dlx
2 , l 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g, reect the possibility of switching to the regime corresponding to lower
than current realizations of x, whereas the opposite is true for components Dlx1 .
Equipped with the valuation formula for Firm 1 when both rms are already present
in the market, we are ready to derive the value of Firm 1, V m1 , prior to Firm 2s entry









where V is dened by (38) and x2 denotes Firm 2s entry threshold (derived in Appendix C).
V m1 equals the monopolistic value of Firm 1 (as dened by (38)) adjusted for the component
reecting competitive entry. The latter component equals the value loss from switching from
monopoly to duopoly multiplied by the probability-weighted discount factor corresponding
to the random time of Firm 2s entry.
In the last step, we determine the value of Firm 1s investment opportunity. We
already know that the valuation formulae for V di¤er across the two regimes (cf. (38)) and
that it is never optimal for Firm 1 to invest in the rst regime. Consequently, when applying
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to (50), we substitute for V the expression
corresponding to the second row in (38). A simple manipulation of the value-matching and
smooth pasting conditions (cf. (40) and (41)) yields the following implicit formula for the
optimal investment threshold of Firm 1, x1
(1   2)BM1 (x1 )
2 + 1 (C0   I) + (1   0:5)C1 (x1 )
0:5
+(1   1)C2x1 = 0: (51)
A comparison of (51) with (42) leads to the observation that x1 = x
. This is in line with
the classic strategic real option models in which the roles of the rms (leader vs. follower)
are determined exogenously and where the rms have a single control variable (investment
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timing). This nding can be explained by the fact that in our case the decision problem
of the Firm 1 with one discrete control variable (timing) and with one continuous control
variable (quality) can be transformed into the problem of a single discrete variable whereas
the relevant payo¤ functions are at each moment optimized with respect to the continuous
variable. Consequently, the value of Firm 1 is no longer a function of quality since this is
chosen optimally given the realization of xt and the choice of exogenous parameters.
The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1, F1, equals
F1 =
 













 A1x1 : (52)
It can immediately be noticed that F1 < F (cf. (43)) because of the present value of future
revenues lost due to competitive entry, which is equal to
V d1 (x






As soon as competitive entry becomes very remote, i.e. when x2 ! 1, it holds that the
problem reduces to the valuation of a monopolistic rm and F1 = F .
5.1 Comparative Statics: Valuation of Firms
Analogous to Section 3, we are interested in the sensitivity of the rmsvalue with respect to
changes of market parameters. Figures 5a and 5b depict the relationship between the market
volatility and the value of the investment opportunities of both rms for di¤erent magnitudes
of network externalities.
Figure 5a. The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 for the parameter values  = 0:5;
k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; x0 = 4; and I = 10:
Figure 5b. The value of the investment opportunity of Firm 1 for the parameter values  = 0:5;
k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; x0 = 4; and I = 10:
Inspection of Figures 5a and 5b leads to two main conclusions First, contrary to the xed
quality case, the value of Firm 1s investment opportunity is higher than the one of Firm 2.
Second, the value of Firm 2s project is non-monotonic in uncertainty (like the value of Firm
1 in the previous case). The rst result is implied by the fact that Firm 1 is a leader in the
investment game but, thanks to its exibility with regard to quality choice, acts as a follower
in the Stackelberg quality game. Consequently, Firm 1 not only receives cash ow from the
project over a longer period but also is able to adjust its quality optimally to the xed the
quality choice of Firm 2, q2, and the realization of the demand, x.
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The non-monotonicity of Firm 2s value in uncertainty results from the fact that
Firm 1 can exploit to a (relatively) larger extent the changes in the demand by changing its
quality when uncertainty is high. Therefore, higher uncertainty a¤ects the e¤ective discount
rates of the components of Firm 2s value that are concave in x (see (C.3)). Consequently, the
presence of such concavities leads to a lower valuation in a more uncertain environment. A
positive relationship between Firm 2s value and uncertainty at the low levels of uncertainty
can be explained by the traditional option argument that, in this case, dominates the strategic
e¤ects.
As far as the relationship between the degree of network externalities and the value of
the rms is concerned, it resembles the picture of the xed quality case. Again, the presence
of the network externalities leads to an increase in the value of the investment opportunities
of both rms and the rate of this increase is high when network externalities are relatively
strong.
5.2 Comparative Statics: Firm 1s Strategic Choice of Variables
In the case in which quality is exible, the following observations can be made. First,
the optimal investment threshold in the presence of entry threat is identical to the level of
x triggering the investment of the monopolist. This is due to the well-known fact that if
the roles of the rms are predetermined and the only choice variable of the leader is the
investment timing, future entry of the follower does not impact the investment timing of the
leader (cf. Huisman, 2001). Second, upon examining (44), we can conclude that the quality
chosen by Firm 1 does not change in a continuous way. In the following subsection, we present
a short discussion of the properties of q1 (x).
5.2.1 Properties of q1 (x)
The optimal quality choice, q1 , piecewise (weakly) increases with the state of the market,
















  a   1
!
< 0: (54)
Realizations ' and { are reversible switch points in which the functional form of the optimal
quality changes. As pointed out by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), the function describ-
ing the optimal choice of a control variable is in general discontinuous in the switch points
(see also Dumas, 1991). Continuity is implied if the switch points are chosen optimally so as
to maximize the value of the rm. Here, the switch points are not chosen optimally by Firm
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1 but, instead, they result from the change of the product market structure. From (44) it can
be seen that for low x Firm 1 ceases operations as the revenues do not cover the operating
costs. When x reaches ' from below, Firm 1 resumes operations and the resulting outcome
is duopolistic. Finally, when x reaches { Firm 1 covers the entire market and the monopoly
prevails. Consequently, the discontinuity of q1 (x) occurs at both ' and {.
The positive sign of (53) results from the fact that the quality of the idle rm equals
a (cf. (44)), whereas resuming the operations requires the quality exceeding k (> a). The
negative sign of (54) can be explained as follows. At the moment x equals { (cf. Figure 4),
quality chosen by Firm 1 is that high that Firm 1 captures all customers. Hence, Firm 2
leaves the market after which Firm 1 reduces quality. It can do so since Firm 2 will not re-
enter (unless x falls below {). Firm 2 knows that if it re-entered, Firm 1 would immediately
raise quality to the optimal duopoly level. We conclude that exible quality serves as an
entry deterrent control here, while still it can be set at the optimal monopoly level.
6 Valuation E¤ects of Flexible vs. Fixed Quality
In this section we analyze the e¤ects on the valuation of the exible vs. xed technology
choice made by Firm 1. We address the following two related questions: i) what is the rela-
tionship between the loss in value due to the expected competitive entry (in comparison with
monopoly) and the xed or exible quality choice, and ii) what is the impact of exibility on
the valuation with and without competitive entry threat. Figures 6a-6d contain a comparison
of the ratio of Firm 1s value in the monopoly vs. duopoly case for exible and xed quality
choice.
Figure 6a. The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1s duopolistic to monopolistic value under
xed quality choice and uncertainty for the parameter values  = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;
 = 0:015; and I = 10:
Figure 6b. The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1s duopolistic to monopolistic value under
exible quality choice and uncertainty for the parameter values  = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;
 = 0:015; and I = 10:
Figure 6c. The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1s exible to xed technology non-strategic
value and uncertainty for the parameter values  = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and
I = 10:
Figure 6d. The relationship between the ratio of Firm 1s exible to xed technology strategic value
and uncertainty for the parameter values  = 0:5; k = 5; c0 = 1; r = 0:05;  = 0:015; and I = 10:
On the basis of Figures 6a and 6b it can be concluded that the value lost due to competitive
entry is much lower when quality is exible (as opposed to xed quality). This results from
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the fact that the exible quality choice is associated with Firm 1s followers role in the
quality game played by the rms at each instant. The second-mover advantage in setting
the quality by the incumbent is stronger when the demand uncertainty is higher. Therefore,
when uncertainty is high, the gap between the monopolistic and the strategic value of Firm
1 is almost closing (cf. Figure 6b). Finally, we can observe that the degree of network
externalities have little e¤ect on the rmsrelative valuation until they become very high in
the xed quality case. Then the fraction of Firm 1s value lost due to the competitive entry
as compared to monopoly is even higher (cf. Figure 6a).
Moreover, we analyze the impact of exible quality choice on the rmsvaluation
from a slightly di¤erent angle. Instead of looking at the value lost due to competitive entry,
we investigate the value impact of a switch from the xed- to exible-quality technology.
Figures 6c and 6d illustrate this e¤ect as a function of demand uncertainty for di¤erent
magnitudes of network externalities. The following conclusions can be drawn. First, the
incremental value of the exible technology over the xed-quality technology is higher in a
strategic than in a monopolistic framework. Moreover, the strategic impact of exibility is
increasing with demand uncertainty (cf. Figure 6d). Whereas in the monopolistic framework
the value gain occurring due to the exible technology is moderate and does not increase
sharply in , both the value gain and its sensitivity towards growing uncertainty are much
more dramatic. Like previously, the value impact of network externalities is relatively small
and a¤ects the advantage of the exible technology adversely.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we determine advantages of exibility in quality choice of a rm considering
an uncertain product market sector exhibiting network externalities. The rm is able to
adjust quality over time when it, for instance, possesses su¢ cient know-how, invented the
technology itself, or adopted a more advanced technology. In general, this requires larger
sunk costs and the aim of this paper is to determine in which cases it is particularly justied
to incur these larger costs.
First, we derive the optimal investment threshold and the quality choice of the rm us-
ing the xed-quality technology in both the monopolistic and duopolistic framework. Second,
we repeat the analysis for the exible technology choice. Finally, we perform a comparison
of outcomes resulting from applying the two alternative technologies.
We show that the qualities chosen by the rms in the xed-quality framework are
strategic complements. This implies that a higher quality chosen by the market leader is
associated with a higher quality provided by the second rm to enter. Moreover, the market
leader uses the quality as a means to deter entry since its level of quality chosen under
competitive entry threat is higher than in an isolated monopolistic market. Finally, since the
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rms play a version of a Stackelberg game in strategic complements, the value of the second
rm to enter exceeds the one of the leader.
We also extend general results of strategic real options theory. From this theory
it is known that if the roles of the rms are exogenous or when they su¢ ciently di¤er in
characteristics, the followers investment timing is irrelevant for the decision of the leader.
However, due to the addition of a second control in the form of quality choice, the investment
timing of the rst investor is inuenced by the decision of the other rm.
If the market leader is able to adjust quality over time, its optimal investment strategy
is identical to the monopolistic case. This observation results from the fact that the loss due to
the competitive entry equally a¤ects the value of its investment opportunity before investing
and the value of the project once the sunk cost is incurred. Moreover, the exible quality
choice of the leader implies three di¤erent market structures as functions of the underlying
demand. When demand is low, only the second rm is active, moderate demand is associated
with both rms serving the market, whereas high demand implies that the entire market is
served by the leader.
A comparison of rms values under two alternative technologies leads to further
conclusions. It appears that the relative value of the exible (as opposed to xed) technology
is much higher in the duopolistic case than in an isolated monopoly. A related observation
is that the value loss from a competitive entry is much lower when the quality is exible.
Second, the value of exible quality choice increases with uncertainty since an immediate
quality adjustment to the changes in stochastic demand is possible. Moreover, the case of
exibility also allows for achieving the second-mover advantage in the Stackelberg game after
the competitive entry. The latter result is amplied if the market uncertainty is high.
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. The optimal quality level is calculated by maximizing (10) with











1 1 (C + I)1 1Rq   (1   1)R1 (C + I)1 2Cq

;
from which it follows that
1 (C + I)Rq   (1   1)RCq = 0: (A.2)




xR = 1 yields the desired result. The
corresponding second-order condition is
(1 (C + I)Rqq + CqRq   (1   1)CqqR)jq=q < 0: (A.3)
This is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the relevant functions which ensures that q
corresponds to a local maximum. This is formulated as Assumption 5.1. If (A.2) has multiple
solutions satisfying (A.3), then the one corresponding to the highest value of (10) is chosen.
Proof of Proposition 2. We begin by dening (cf. (A.2))
H (q) = 1 (C (q) + I)Rq (q)  (1   1)Cq (q)R (q) : (A.4)
For q it holds that H (q; ) = 0. Therefore, the impact of a change in  2 fa; g can be
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((C + I)Rq   CqR) > 0:


















CqR  (C + I)Rq
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: (A.11)













(1   1)CqR  1 (C + I)Rq
R2
= 0: (A.12)









This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. The sign of derivative dq2=dq

1 immediately follows from (27)
and the argument thereafter. In order to determine the sign of dx2=dq




















Since we already know that q
2
is an increasing function of q1 (cf. (20)), the desired result is
obtained if we can show that the two last factors of (A.15) increase with q
2
. We rst derive
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expressions for q2   q2 and q2   a on the basis of (27):
q2   q2 =
1












  a+ 41Ir (   1) (1  2) c 10

;
q2   a =
1
















  a+ 41Ir (   1) (1  2) c 10

:
By inspecting (A.16) we immediately conclude that the second factor of (A.15) is increasing
with q
2
. Now, we concentrate on the derivative of the ratio q2 aq2 q2
. It can be written (using























































































































































This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proposition can be proven by analyzing the prot
functions of the rms in a duopoly and two cases of a monopoly. Prot maximization based
on the system of demands (18) with the optimal quality schedule of Firm 1 (44) yields the























 = c0 (q2   a) : (A.21)
Here, '; and  are functions of q2, which is chosen at the beginning of the game (the quality
chosen by Firm 2 is xed at the moment of undertaking investment). Since 2 is concave
and decreasing for su¢ ciently large x (but smaller than {), we get that for x > { it holds
that 2 = n2 = 0 (since Firm 2 will cease the production in the region x 2 ({;1), where the
attainable prot is negative). In the same fashion in can be shown that 1 = 0 for x < ':
What remains to be proved is that ' < {. It can be seen upon manipulating (45) and (46)
that
{   ' = c0









 > 0, q1   q1 > 0:
The latter inequality is proven directly by observing that







This completes the proof.
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B Value function coe¢ cients with exible quality
B.1 Non-strategic case
The following coe¢ cients are derived on the basis of Bellman equation (37) with value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions applied to V for x =  and with no-bubble condi-





0:5 2 (1   0:5)
2   1
+ C2







0:5 1 (2   0:5)
2   1
+ C2














By either solving the Bellman equation of type (37) with a non-homogeneity term being
proportional to the n-th power of x, or by calculating the drift coe¢ cient in the GBM for
y  xn using Itôs lemma, it can be shown that the e¤ective discount rate corresponding to
the n-th power has a form r   n   0:5n (n  1)2 (cf. Dixit, 1993, p. 13). Of course, this




if nite valuations are to be obtained.
B.2 Strategic case
The following coe¢ cients are derived on the basis of Bellman equation (47) with value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions applied to V d1 for x = ' and x = {, and with
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no-bubble conditions for x! 0 and x!1:
D1  E2
'1 2 (1   1)
2   1
+ E1
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r   : (B.11)
35
C Derivation of Firm 2s optimal investment threshold
First, we derive the value of the Firm 2. Denote the value of the Firm 2 after entering the
















1:5 + c0  x+ 
p
'x0:5   c0 

for ' < x < {;
0 for x > {:
(C.2)
In (C.2) the value of 2 for x > { is zero since for high demand, Firm 1 captures the entire
market share (cf. Lemma 5). For ' < x < { the result corresponds to (A.20), whereas for
x < ' Firm 2 achieves monopoly prot (cf. (23)) since Firm 1 remains idle. Solving (C.1)
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r   1:5  0:3752 : (C.13)
Despite the fact that the expressions for the value of Firm 2 di¤er across the regimes, cal-
culating the option value of the investment opportunity of Firm 2 represents no additional
di¢ culty comparing to the traditional analysis. It can be shown that the value is negative
under the rst regime (x < '), reaches a peak under the second regime (' < x < {), and
tends asymptotically to zero under the third regime (x > {). Therefore, it cannot be optimal
for Firm 2 to invest under regimes one and three. Consequently, the value of Firm 2s option
to invest can be calculated on the basis of the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
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From this it is obtained that the optimal investment threshold of Firm 2, x2 , is implicitly
dened by





+ (1   0:5)CD1 (x2 )
0:5
+(1   0:5)CD2 x2 x+ (1   0:5)CD3 (x2 )
1:5 = 0
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